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Abstrakt: V předložené práci studujeme způsob stanovení výše kapitálového
požadavku ke kreditnímu riziku, který byl navržen Basilejským výborem pro
bankovní dohled a který je po zaintegrování do evropské legislativy, t.j. od
1.1.2007 závazný pro banky a další finanční instituce v členských státech
Evropské unie.
Diplomová práce nejprve uvádí základní prvky a principy celého doku-
mentu z roku 2004 známého pod názvem Basel II (The New Basel Capi-
tal Accord, Nová kapitálová dohoda). Poté následuje detailní rozbor části
prvního pilíře, která se zabývá kreditním rizikem. V další kapitole jsou pop-
sány tři matematické modely, ze kterých je výpočet kapitálového požadavku
odvozen. Na základě teoretických znalostí těchto modelů a s pomocí výsledků
studií provedených Basilejským výborem je postupně vysvětlena každá část
výsledného vzorce, ktery je pak aplikován na hypotetické úvěrové portfolio
banky. V závěru práce jsou porovnány výstupy basilejského vzorce pro dané
portfolio se simulací reality na základě daných předpokladů.
Klíčová slova: kapitálový požadavek, default, úvěrové portfolio
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Abstract: In the present work we study the process of determination of cap-
ital requirement for credit risk that is recommended by the Basel Commitee
for Banking Supervision to implement into national legislation and that is
also obligatory for all European banks since it is a part of the Capital Re-
quirement Directive.
At the beginning of this thesis, basic principles and three pillars of The
New Basel Capital Accord (2004), better known as Basel II, are described.
After focusing on the part of the first pillar dealing with credit risk, different
approaches to credit risk measurement are introduced. The most important
formula for the advanced internal-ratings based approach is then analyzed
under the settings of mathematical models it is based on. In the last chapter,
the output of the formula for capital requirement calculated for a given
hypothetic portfolio is compared to the estimate of unexpected loss, that
the requirement should correspond to.
Keywords: capital requirement, default, loan portfolio
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Chapter 1
Úvod / Introduction
Kreditní riziko patří z důvodu obvykle velkého objemu úvěrů, hypoték a
půjček na straně aktiv k nejpodstatnějším rizikům působícím na finanční
instituce. Je to riziko, že dlužník banky nesplní své závazky podle dohod-
nutých podmínek. Banky si jsou tohota rizika vědomi a proto vytváří různé
rezervy a opravné položky. Ale ty jsou obvykle ve výši očekávané ztráty.
Basilejský výbor pro bankovní dohled v tzv. dokumentu Basel II stanovil
výpočet takové výše kapitálu, aby banky byly chráněny ve většine případech.
Tj. tvrdí, že je třeba mimo již vytvořených rezerv ponechat ještě další
kapitál, tak aby banka, potažmo vklady drobných střadatelů, byla chráněna
na 99,9%.
Basel II byl vypracován vrámci harmonizace národních legislativ. Vedle
kreditního rizika se zabývá i otázkami operačního a tržního rizika, dohledu
a tržní dispilíny. Byl zaintergrován do evropské legislativy prostřednictvím
směrnice Evropského parlamentu a Rady 2006/48/ES o přístupu k činnosti
úvěrových institucí a o jejím výkonu a směrnicí 2006/49/ES o kapitálové
přiměřenosti investičních podniků a úvěrových institucí (obě ze dne 14.června
2006) a je proto závazný pro všechny banky v členských státech Evrop-
ské unie. Do české legislativy byl implementován vyhláškou České národní
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banky č.123/2007 Sb., o obezřetném podnikání bank, spořitelních a úvěrních
družstev a obchodníků s cennými papíry.
Tento dokument jako celek je popisován v druhé kapitole, kdežto ve
třetí kapitole jsme se zaměřili pouze na oblast kreditního rizika. Basel II
bankám umožňuje (pokud splní určité požadavky) vybrat si ze tří různých
přístupů k výpočtu rizikových vah používaných při stanovení kapitálového
požadavku. Tyto přístupy se liší především způsobem vyčíslení rizikových
komponent vzorce. Těmi jsou pravděpodobnost selhání (defaultu), ztráta
při selhání, expozice a doba splatnosti. Dále se tato práce zabývá matem-
atickými modely, na nichž Basel II staví, a detaily vzorce stanoveného pro
výpočet kapitálové přiměřenosti a jeho provázanost s uvedenými modely.
Poslední kapitola porovnává doposud popisovaný vzorec s výsledky simulace
pro hypotetické portfolio prováděných v softwaru Wolfram Mathematica 6.0.
Zabýváme se poměrem mezi kapitálovým požadavkem vypočítaným podle
Basel II pro různé vstupní hodnoty portfolia a odhadem neočekávané ztráty
toho samého portfolia. Kapitálový požadavek by právě měl pokrýt tuto
neočekávanou ztrátu, která je stanovena jako rozdíl mezi 99,9-procentním
kvantilem rozdělení ztráty a střední hodnotou tohoto rozdělení, a proto nás
zajímá, zda a kdy je tento podíl blízko jedné.
Bank´s assets consist from a large part of credits and mortgages and the
bank is therefore influenced by credit risk, risk that a borrower does not
meet his liability in full. Banks are aware of this risk but they only care
about the expected loss.
The procedure of how to deal with unexpected loss and how much capital
to hold is given by the New Basel Capital Accord (known as Basel II). This
document issued by the Basel Commitee on Banking Supervision in June
2004 was later transformed into a directive of the European Union and is
obligatory for all European banks.
We describe this document in the second chapter, the part dealing with
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credit risk and basic principles for assessing capital requirement for credit
risk is discussed in the third chapter. Banks are allowed to choose between
three distinct approaches, subject to some minimum requirements. This ap-
proaches differ in the ability provide own estimates of risk components. These
are default probability, loss given default, exposure and effective maturity.
The fourth chapter includes three mathematical models Basel II is based
on and serves as an introduction to the capital requirement assessing in
chapter five. The formula and also its characteristics are explained here in
details. In the last chapter we would like to compare the capital requirement
formula with the estimated unexpected loss for a hypothetic portfolio. For
simulations we use the Wolfram Mathematica 6.0 software.
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Chapter 2
The New Basel Capital Accord
In June 2004 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)1 issued a
Revised Framework on International Convergence of Capital Measurement
and Capital Standards (also known as Basel II or the New Basel Capital
Accord) [4]. This Revised Framework will be applied on a consolidated basis
to internationally active banks and should serve as the basis for further
national implementation processes in order to protect depositors. It is also
intended to encourage ongoing improvements in banks’ risk management. A
bank is supposed to know its loan portfolio better than the supervisor.
After extensive dialogue with industry participants and national super-
visors, Committee replaced the 1988 Accord (with several amendments) to
improve the way regulatory capital requirements reflect underlying risks,
the greatest disadvantage of the prior modification. Basel II is also designed
to better reflect the developement of financial markets in the 90´s of 20th
century, for example, the creation of asset securitisation structures. Another
aspect to the modification was the feedback received from banks participat-
1The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is a committee of banking supervisory
authorities which was established by the central-bank Governors of the Group of Ten
countries at the end of 1974. It usually meets at the Bank for International Settlements
in Basel, Switzerland, where its permanent Secretariat is located.
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ing in several impact studies, altogether more than 350 banks of varying size
and levels of complexity from more than 40 countries.
The New Basel Capital Accord consists of three pillars:
• Minimum capital requirements,
• Supervisory review of capital adequacy, and
• Market discipline.
The minimum capital requirement is determined by three different kinds
of risk faced by banks: credit risk2, market risk3 and operational risk4. The
procedure of calculations is described in paragraphs 40 and 44: In calculating
the capital ratio, the denominator or total risk-weighted assets will be deter-
mined by multiplying the capital requirements for market risk (CRmarket) and
operational risk (CRoperational) by 12.5 (i.e. the reciprocal of the minimum
capital ratio of 8%) and adding the resulting figures to the sum of risk-
weighted assets (RWA) compiled for credit risk. The ratio will be calculated
using regulatory capital as the numerator. The total capital ratio must be no
lower than 8%.
Regulatory Capital
1.06× RWA + 12.5× (CRmarket + CRoperational) ≥ 8% (2.1)
Banks are allowed to use distinct approaches to the measurement of cap-
ital requirements for credit and operational risk. As for market risk, certain
basic requirements for positions eligible to receive trading book capital treat-
ment are specified in Basel II, Part 2, Section VI. We will focus on credit
risk in following chapters.
2Risk that the counterparty is no longer able to pay back the promised payment.
3Arising from trading activities of banks.
4Operational risk is defined as the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed
internal processes, people and systems.
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Paragraph 14 of the New Basel Capital Accord provides explanation for
the factor 1.06: The Committee believes it is important to reiterate its ob-
jectives regarding the overall level of minimum capital requirements. These
are to broadly maintain the aggregate level of such requirements, while also
providing incentives to adopt the more advanced risk-sensitive approaches of
the revised Framework. To attain the objective, the Committee applies a scal-
ing factor to the risk-weighted asset amounts for credit risk under the IRB
approach. The current best estimate of the scaling factor using quantitative
impact study data is 1.06.
The pillar II Supervisory review of capital adequacy ensures the effectiv-
ity of both sides when pointing to the need for banks to assess their capital
adequacy positions relative to their overall risks, and for supervisors to re-
view and take appropriate actions in response to those assessments.
The purpose of the third pillar Market discipline is to complement pillar
I and II by providing a set of disclosure requirements that allow market
participants to assess key information about a bank’s risk profile.
12
Chapter 3
Overview of Credit Risk
Approaches in Basel II
3.1 Introduction to the Credit Loss
Under the New Basel Capital Accord, banks are allowed to choose among
three approaches to calculate their capital requirement to cover credit risk:
the standardised approach, the foundation internal ratings-based (IRB) ap-
proach and the advanced IRB approach. Before describing these three meth-
ods in details, we need to introduce the basis of how the credit loss is derived.
Let n denote the number of loans in the portfolio. The annual credit
loss of the portfolio1 is given by
Ln =
n∑
i=1
Di × LGDi × EADi,
where
• Di is a Bernoulli random variable. Di = 1 if the i-th obligor defaults
within a one-year interval, Di = 0 otherwise. The default probabil-
1Note that values of losses are all considered to be positive.
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ity of the i-th obligor over a one-year time horizon PDi is then the
unconditional expected value of this variable,
• loss given default of the i-th instrument LGDi represents random
percentage of exposure the bank might lose in case of borrower´s de-
fault in the particular year. This percentage can depend on the type
and amount of collateral. It can be also represented by the recovery
rate. In this case LGDi = 1− recovery rate. For instance, if a default
event leads to the recovery rate of 40%, LGDi is then 60% of the
exposure.
• EADi is the i-th instrument´s exposure at default, which is the
economic value of the claim on the counterparty at the time of default.
It is also a random variable because we don´t know when the default
occurs (if it occurs) and what will the economic value developement
be.
The total loss experienced in a particular year is a random variable.
It is impossible for the bank to know the next year´s loss. There exist,
nevertheless, some figures a bank is able to forecast. Expected Losses
(EL) perform the average level of total credit losses a bank can reasonably
expect to suffer. It is a cost component and is therefore covered by provisions
and revenues. The expected loss for the i-th obligor can be written as
ELi = PDi × LGDi × EADi. (3.1)
Losses above the expected level are usually referred to as Unexpected
Losses (UL) (as shown in figure 3.1, source [3]). Bank has some means that
could absorb a part of unexpected losses (e.g. interest rates) but in the event
of peak losses, additional capital is needed. On the other hand, holding too
much capital for such a case means less profit for the bank. Thus, banks
and their regulatory supervisors must carefully balance the risks of holding
capital and the profit from that.
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Figure 3.1: An example of loss rate experience
Capital is required so that it should protect the bank in most cases. We
usually talk about the 99.9% confidence level. For this purpose we need to
introduce the Value-at-Risk (VaR) variable2. Under our settings, it is
defined as the q-th quantile of the distribution function of total credit loss
at a given confidence level q. It holds
P [Ln > VaRq(Ln)] = 1− q. (3.2)
The sum of expected and unexpected losses is then set to equal the Value-
at-Risk (VaR) at this confidence level (see figure 3.2 , source [3]).
UL = VaRq(Ln)− EL. (3.3)
In addition, Basel II requires banks to undertake credit risk stress tests
to underpin all these calculations. As described in paragraphs 434 and 435:
Stress testing must involve identifying possible events or future changes in
economic conditions that could have unfavourable effects on a bank’s credit
exposures. The test to be employed must be meaningful and reasonably con-
servative. Individual banks may develop different approaches to undertaking
2Value-at-Risk as a risk measure is easy to comprehend but it is difficult to calculate
in case of insufficient data.
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Figure 3.2: Typical loss rate density function
this stress test requirement, depending on their circumstances. For this pur-
pose, the objective is not to require banks to consider worst-case scenarios.
The bank’s stress test in this context should, however, consider at least the
effect of mild recession scenarios. In this case, one example might be to use
two consecutive quarters of zero growth to assess the effect on the bank’s
PDs, LGDs and EADs, taking account – on a conservative basis – of the
bank’s international diversification.
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3.2 Credit Risk - The Standardised Approach
The standardised approach is an extenstion of the 1988 Accord, with more
sophisticated classification of categories for credit risk. To determine the risk
weights in the standardised approach, banks may use assessments by external
credit assessment institutions recognised as eligible for capital purposes by
national supervisors, divide their portfolios into classes and then follow the
numbers given in table 3.1. The risk category of 150% is newly introduced.
Consideration of collaterals is another advantage of this extention. Claims
secured by residential property (in the table labeled as Mortgages) will be
weighted by 35%.
There are two possible options for claims on banks. Option 1 is based
on the risk weight of the sovereign country where the bank is situated, but
one category less favourable. Option 2 (subject to some floors) is based on
the assessment of the bank itself. Preferential risk weights labeled with ST
(short term) can be applied to claims with original maturity of 3 months
or less. In general, these short term claims are evaluated one category more
favourable.
After setting-up the risk weights and deriving the exposure value the way
given in section 2.II. of the New Basel Capital Accord, capital for a given
loan is derived as
Capital Requirement = Risk Weight× Exposure× 8%.
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Assessment
Claim on AAA to
AA-
A+ to
A-
BBB+
to
BBB-
BB+ to
BB-
Below
B-
Unrated
Sovereigns 0 20 50 100 150 100
Banks 20 50 100 100 150 100
20 50 LT 50 LT 100 LT 150 50 LT
20 ST 20 ST 50 ST 20 ST
Corporates 20 50 100 100 150 100
Mortgages 35
Retail 75
Table 3.1: An example of percentage risk weights in the standardised ap-
proach
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3.3 Credit Risk - The Internal Ratings-Based
Approach
Since 1988, when the first Capital Accord was published, the financial world
has changed dramatically and there was a growing demand within the finan-
cial world for a new capital accord. Basel II should serve as an operative and
more flexible mean for the banking system how to measure the potentially
right level of capital and for the supervisors how to set their legal framework.
Under the IRB approach bank must categorize instruments into classes
of assets with different underlying risk characteristics as well as under the
standard approach. Asset classes are defined in paragraphs 215 - 243 and
differ in three key elements:
(i) risk components,
(ii) risk-weight functions by which risk components are transformed into
risk weighted assets, and
(iii) minimum requirements that must be met in order for a bank to use the
IRB approach for a given asset class.
According to paragraph 180 of the New Basel Capital Accord the risk
components include measures of the
• probability of default (PD),
• loss given default (LGD),
• the exposure at default (EAD), and
• effective maturity (M).
Paragraph 245 provides the difference between the foundation IRB ap-
proach and the advanced IRB approach: Under the foundation approach, as
a general rule, banks provide their own estimates of PD and rely on super-
visory estimates for other risk components. Under the advanced approach,
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banks provide more of their own estimates of PD, LGD and EAD, and their
own calculation of M, subject to meeting minimum standards.
Under the foundation IRB approach, senior claims on corporates, sovereigns
and banks not secured by recognised collateral will be assigned a 45% LGD
and all subordinated claims on corporates, sovereigns and banks a 75% LGD.
Effective maturity (M) will be 2.5 years except for repo-style transactions
where the effective maturity will be 6 months. As for EAD, 100% of on-
balance sheet items must be taken into account. But also off-balance sheet
items are taken into consideration. Prescribed credit conversion factors are
applied to them.
On the basis of the work of Merton [9] and Vasicek [10], BCBS decided
to adopt the assumptions of a normal distribution for the systematic and
idiosyncratic risk factors of a credit portfolio and the technique of computing
PDs. For the model behind the capital requirements function BCBS assumes
even more, the model should be portfolio-invariant, i.e. capital required for
any given loan should only depend on the risk of that loan and must not de-
pend on the portfolio it is added to. Basel II is therefore built on the Gordy´s
thoughts [8] because it can be shown that only so called Asymptotic Single
Risk Factor (ASRF) Models fulfil such a condition of portfolio-invariance.
These three models will be described in next chapter.
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Chapter 4
Mathematical Foundations of
Risk Weight Formulas
4.1 Merton´s Model
The Merton´s model refers to a model proposed by Robert C. Merton in 1974
for assessing the credit risk of a company by characterizing the company’s
equity as a Europian call option on its assets. Many studies published in
the first half of the 70´s were focused on the time structure of interest rates
but Merton was the first economist dealing with probabilities of default.
His paper called On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of
Interest Rates [9] the basis for further extentions.
Merton assumes a diffusion-type stochastic process for the value of the
firm at time t Vt. This process is given by a stochastic differential equation
dVt = rVtdt+ σVtdzt, (4.1)
where r is the (constant) instantaneous expected rate of return on the firm
per unit of time, σ2 is the (constant) instantaneous variance of the return on
the firm per unit of time and zt is a standard Wiener process with following
properties.
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• z0 = 0,
• zt is almost surely continuous,
• zt has independent increments with distribution zt − zs ∼ N (0, t− s),
t > s ≥ 0.
For the Wiener process it holds that the change dzt during a small period
of time dt could be rewritten as dzt = εt
√
dt, where εt is a random drawing
from a standard normal distribution N (0, 1).
Consequently, since
E
(
dVt
Vt
)
= E(rdt+ σdzt) = rdt,
and
Var
(
dVt
Vt
)
= Var(rdt+ σdzt) = Var(σεt
√
dt) = σ2dt,
the relative change in the firm value is normally distributed with the expec-
tation of rdt and the variance of σ2dt, denoted by
dVt
Vt
∼ N
(
rdt, σ2dt
)
.
For further calculations we need to introduce the Itô´s Lemma:
Let yt be governed by a diffusion process
dyt = µt(yt, t)dt+ σt(yt, t)dzt.
Let g = g(yt, t) be twice differentiable. Then
dg =
∂g
∂t
dt+
∂g
∂yt
dyt +
1
2
∂2g
∂y2t
(dyt)
2.
For our purposes, we substitute yt = Vt and define g = lnVt. Thus,
d lnVt = 0dt+
1
Vt
(rVtdt+σVtdzt)−1
2
1
V 2t
(rVtdt+σVtdzt)
2 =
(
r−σ
2
2
)
dt+σdzt.
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When considering the time period from time 0 to time T , we can derive
the distribution of the firm value at a future time T .
lnVT − lnV0 =
∫ T
0
d lnVt =
(
r − σ
2
2
)
T + σdzT
E(lnVT − lnV0) =
(
r − σ
2
2
)
T,
Var(lnVT − lnV0) = σ2T.
Following the notation of the standard Wiener process, where ε is a
random drawing from the standard normal distribution, lnVT and VT can
be expressed as
lnVT = lnV0 +
(
r − σ
2
2
)
T + σ
√
TεT , (4.2)
VT = V0 exp
((
r − σ
2
2
)
T + σ
√
TεT
)
. (4.3)
The distribution of lnVt is therefore normal,
lnVT ∼ N
(
lnV0 +
(
r − σ
2
2
)
T, σ2T
)
, (4.4)
and VT follows lognormal distribution.
In order to treat the firm equity as a call option we need to suppose
following: there are only two classes of claims, debt and equity. The firm
promised to pay an amount of B to the bondholders on the specified date
T . In the event this payment is not met, the bondholders take over the
company. From the stockholders´ point of view, they either get what is left
over after the debt paying on the date T , or they lose whole investment.
This characteristics could be represented by
ST = max(VT −B, 0), (4.5)
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where ST denotes the value of firm equity at time T and VT the value of the
firm at time T .
This expression shows that the equity is a call option on the value of the
firm (its assets) with a strike price equal to the book value of the liabilities
(promised payment). The Black-Scholes formula1 for our option tells us
S0(V0, τ) = V0N(x1)−Be−rτN(x2)2, (4.6)
where S0 is the current value of equity depending on current value of the
firm V0 and time to maturity τ ,
N(x) =
1√
2pi
∫ x
−∞
exp
(
− 1
2
z2
)
dz
is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the standard normal dis-
tribution,
x1 =
1
σ
√
τ
[
ln
V0
B
+ (r +
σ2
2
)τ
]
,
and
x2 = x1 − σ
√
τ =
1
σ
√
τ
[
ln
V0
B
+ (r − σ
2
2
)τ
]
.
The default condition VT < B (the firm cannot pay the debt because the
value of assets is less than the value of liabilitites) specifies the unconditional
probability of default as
p = P [VT < B].
As given by 4.5, ST = 0 in this case and the bondholders took over the whole
1First introduced by Fisher Black and Myron Scholes in 1973. Merton and Scholes
received the 1997 Nobel Prize in Economics for this and related work. Black was mentioned
as a contributor.
2Note that Be−rτ is the discounted debt.
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company. Subtituting VT as the expression in 4.3 yields
p = P
[
V0 exp
((
r − σ
2
2
)
T + σ
√
TεT
)
< B
]
= P
[
lnV0 +
(
r − σ
2
2
)
T + σ
√
TεT < lnB
]
= P
[
σ
√
TεT < lnB − lnV0 −
(
r − σ
2
2
)
T
]
= P
[
εT < −
ln(V0/B) +
(
r − σ2/2
)
T
σ
√
T
]
= P [εT < −x2]
= N(−x2).
The advantage of this model is the advantage of the Black-Scholes for-
mula, i.e. the ability to compute desired results only from a few values that
are either known or can be easily computed. Disadvantages, however, are
given by the represention of dVt as a diffusion process with constant load-
ings. In reality, the expected rate of return as well as the variance of return
depend on time.
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4.2 Vasicek´s Model
The following thoughts have been published in Oldrich Alfons Vasicek´s
papers Loan Portfolio Value [10]. The core settings of Vasicek´s model are
originated from Merton´s model, however, specific assumptions about the
loss portfolio are made.
Consider a portfolio consisting of n loans in equal dollar amounts. Let
the probability of default on any single loan be p, and assume that the asset
values of the borrowing companies are correlated with a coefficient ρ for
any two companies. We will further assume that loans have the same term
T . (Such a large number of assumptions is a great weakness of this model.
Especially when the portfolios do not consist of loans from one industry in
order to diversify the risk.)
For purposes of this section we can derive the portfolio percentage gross
loss L as
L =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Li,
where Li is the gross loss on the i-th loan and Li = 1 if the i-th borrower
defaults, Li = 0 otherwise.
Given the central limit theorem, the portfolio loss distribution would
converge to a normal distribution as the number of loans increases if the
defaults on the loans in our portfolio were independent of each other. Because
it is not such a case, the conditions of the central limit theorem are not
satisfied and L is not asymtotically normal. However, there exists a limiting
distribution as explained later.
Following the Merton´s model and the equation 4.2, the logarithm of the
asset value of the i-th firm at time T could be expressed as
lnViT = lnVi0 +
(
ri − σ
2
i
2
)
T + σi
√
TεiT . (4.7)
The variables εi are jointly standard normal distributed. Vasicek pro-
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poses to rewrite them as
εi = aiY + biZi,
where Y , Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn are mutually independent (and without loss of
generality) standard normal variables. The random variable Y can be in-
terpreted as a portfolio common factor (systematic risk) over the interval
(0, T ), e.g. economic index, and the set of variables Z1, Z2, ..., Zn as idiosyn-
cratic risk factors. Then the term Y
√
ρ is the company´s exposure to the
common risk factor and the term Zi
√
1− ρ represents the company specific
risk.
In order to ensure next assumtion of equal pairwise correlation coefficient
ρ and in order to get the standard normal ditribution of εi, constants ai needs
to equal ±√ρ as well as bi needs to equal ±
√
1− ρ for every i. Then
E(εi) = E(aiY + biZi) = aiE(Y ) + biE(Zi) = 0,
Var(εi) = E(ε
2
i )− E(εi)2 = E
(
(aiY + biZi)
2
)
− 0
= a2iE(Y )
2 + 2aibiE(Y Zi) + b
2
iE(Zi)
2
= a2i + b
2
i = ρ+ (1− ρ) = 1,
Corr(εi, εj) = Cov(εi, εj) = Cov(aiY + biZi, ajY + bjZj)
= aiajCov(Y, Y ) + aibjCov(Y, Zj) + biajCov(Zi, Y ) + bibjCov(Zi, Zj)
= aiaj = ρ.
Vasicek denotes
ai =
√
ρ , bi =
√
1− ρ , ∀i = 1, ..., n,
and therefore
εi =
√
ρY +
√
1− ρZi.
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Based on all the settings mentioned above, we will evaluate the condi-
tional probability of default, conditional on the realization of Y . This can be
interpreted as assuming various scenarios for the economy, determining the
probability of a given portfolio loss under each scenario and then weight-
ing each scenario by its likelihood. When the common factor is fixed, the
probability of default of any single obligor is
p(Y ) = P [Li = 1 | Y ]
= P [εi < −x2 | Y ]
= P [
√
1− ρZi +√ρY < −x2 | Y ]
= P
[
Zi <
−x2 −√ρY√
1− ρ | Y
]
= P
[
Zi <
N−1(p¯)−√ρY√
1− ρ
]
= N
(
N−1(p¯)−√ρY√
1− ρ
)
.
Whereas the value of p(Y ) provides the loan default probability under
given scenario, the value p¯ is the average of the conditional probabilities over
all scenarios.
We decomposed εi so that Y represents the common factor. Then if
specific value of Y is assumed, the variables Li are iid variables with a finite
variance and the conditions of the law of large numbers hold. The portfolio
loss conditional on Y converges to its expectation p(Y ) as n→∞. Then
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P [L ≤ x] = P [p(Y ) ≤ x]
= P
[
N
(N−1(p¯)−√ρY√
1− ρ
)
≤ x
]
= P
[
N−1(p¯)−√ρY ≤
√
1− ρN−1(x)
]
= P
[
Y ≥ N
−1(p¯)−√1− ρN−1(x)√
ρ
]
= N
(√
1− ρN−1(x)−N−1(p¯)√
ρ
)
.
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4.3 Gordy´s Model
Michael B. Gordy, member of Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, published in 2002 paper A Risk-Factor Model Foundation for Ratings-
Based Bank Capital Rules [8]. In this paper he shows that ratings-based
capital rules can be reconciled by the class of credit VaR models because
of the following proposition. Contributions to VaR are portfolio-invariant
only if (i) the portfolio is asymptotically fine-grained, and (ii) there is only
a single risk factor driving correlations across obligors.
What does it mean portfolio-invariance and asymptotically fine-grained?
Capital charges are portfolio-invariant if capital charges on given instrument
depend only on its own characteristics, but not on the characterteristics of
the portfolio in which the instrument is held. The latter term could be ex-
plained as the property that no single exposure in the portfolio can account
for more than an arbitrarily small share of total portfolio exposure. Idiosyn-
cratic risk is totally diversified away.
Let X represent the one-dimensional risk factor, which is generally drawn
from a known distribution. When assuming that all the correlations in de-
fault events are explained by this risk factor (e.g. industrial index), then
conditional on X, the remaining risk must be idiosyncratic to the individual
obligor.
We are interested in the borrower´s default which happens if and only if
the asset return drops bellow some threshold value γi. Let Ri represent the
return on the i-th obligor´s assets. Ri is given by
Ri = ψiεi − ωiX,
where the εi, i = 1, 2, ..., n, are independent identically distributed drawings
from the standard normal distribution and represent the idiosyncratic risk
factors. The weights ψi and ωi3 are scaled so that Ri has mean zero, variance
3Gordy used the minus sign before ωiX only to get the pi(x) function increasing in x.
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one, as in Vasicek´s model. The same as in Vasicek´s model is also the
conditional default probability of the i-th obligor pi(X):
pi(X) = P [Ri ≤ γi | X] = N((γi + ωix)/ψi),
where N is the standard normal CDF and γi the threshold value.
Gordy better introduces a new variable that should give better outcome
than default status. Let the random variable Ui denote loss per dollar expo-
sure of the i-th obligor and Ai the propriate exposure. The usual assump-
tion of conditional independence of defaults (the εi´s are iid) is extended
to conditional independence of the Ui´s. Formally, Gordy assumes that the
Ui, i = 1, 2, ..., n, are bounded in the unit interval and, conditional on X,
are mutually independent.
For the portfolio of n obligors, define the portfolio loss ratio Ln4 as the
ratio of total loss to total portfolio exposure, i.e.
Ln =
∑n
i=1 UiAi∑n
i=1Ai
.
The q-th quantile of the distribution of this loss ratio is denoted by αq(Ln).
We should now better remind that the portfolio is asymptotically fine-
grained, i.e. the share of the largest single exposure in total portfolio expo-
sure vanishes to zero as the number of exposures in the portfolio increases.
Under these quite general assumtions, Gordy derives two important propo-
sitions5 about the distribution of Ln. The former one says that the condi-
tional ditribution of Ln degenerates to its conditional expectation as n→∞,
i.e.
conditional on X = x, Ln − E[Ln | x]→ 0, almost surely.
The latter one helps us if we wish to know the variance of the loss ratio.
Then we can use the variance of the conditional expectation.
Var[Ln]− Var[E[Ln | X]]→ 0.
4Instead of former L = 1n
∑n
i=1 Li.
5For details and proofs see [8].
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However, what really interests us is how to derive the q-th quantile of
the portfolio loss distibution αq(Ln). Let´s look at the Proposition 3 in the
Gordy´s paper. In intuitive terms, it allows us to substitute the quantiles
of E[Ln | X] (which typically are relatively easy to calculate) for the corre-
sponding quantiles of the loss ratio Ln as the portfolio becomes large. Gordy
emphasizes that we have obtained this results with very minimal restrictions
on the portfolio and the nature of credit risk. Each asset may be of quite
varied probability of default, expected loss given default, and exposure size.
More importantly, these three characteristics of the distribution of Ln hold
even if the systematic risk factor X is a vector of any finite length and with
any distribution.
For following results it is required that the distribuiton of Ln be nice.6
αq(E[Ln | X]) = E[Ln | αq(X)],
P [Ln ≤ E[Ln | αq(X)]]→ q,
and
| αq(Ln)− E[Ln | αq(X)] |→ 0.
After stating all these properties we can conclude, that the q-th quantile
of the loss ratio can be asymptotically calculated as
αq(Ln) = αq(E(Ln | X)) = E(Ln | αq(X)) =
∑n
i=1 E(Ui | αq(X))Ai∑n
i=1Ai
(4.8)
and that the essence of calculating the asymptotic capital requirement for
expected and unexpected loss on loan i is the evaluation of E(Ui | αq(X)).
6Such requirements are quite complicated in order not to exclude some hedging in-
struments from the portfolio. For details see [8]
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Chapter 5
IRB Risk Weighted Functions
5.1 General Principles
In this chapter we assume that risk components are already estimated by
bank (subject to supervisory requirements in Basel II, Part2, Section III.H)
or overtaken from the supervisor. We have to distinguish between average
PDs and conditional PDs. Average PDs are in fact those computed by banks.
These probabilities of default reflect expected default rates under normal
business conditions and are estimated from observed values.
Whereas conditional PDs are derived from average PDs using a special
mapping function (see section 4.2) to reflect default rates given an appro-
priately conservative value of the risk factor, the same for all loans.
Expected loss (given by average PD) should be covered by banks on an
ongoing basis (by provisions, corrections and write-offs), because it repre-
sents a cost component of the lending business. The unexpected loss (given
by conditional PD), on the other side, relates to potentially large losses that
occur rather seldomly. Up to the Third Consultative Paper of BCBS from
April 2003, EL was also included in the risk weight assets as well. That
means capital was required in order to cover the total Value at Risk. Nowa-
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days required capital relates to UL only. However, banks have to demostrate
that they build adequiate provisions against EL.
Throughout this section, PD and LGD are measured as decimals, and
EAD is measured as currency (e.g. euros). When computing the capital
requirement for a single loan as a percentage of its exposure we have to
derive the unexpected loss from equations 3.3, 3.1.
UL = αq(L)− EL
= αq(L)− PD × LGD,
where PD denotes the average default probability.
Let´s now remember formulas in the section Vasicek´s Model, especially
those ones on page 29. p(Y ) denotes the conditional default probability and
p(Y ) = P [Li = 1|Y ]. Under the Basel II settings, Di is the Bernoulli random
variable and percentage loss of the i-th obligor is given by the product of Di
and LGDi. In contrast to PDs, Basel II does not transform average LGDs
into conditional LGDs. Instead, banks are asked to report LGDs that reflect
economic-downturn conditions caused by expected recession. It follows that
LGD does not depend on the risk factor and can be therefore treated as a
constant. Returning to the Vasicek´s model under the Basel II settings and
substituting q = 0.999, for a single loan we get
0.999 = P [L < α0.999(L)]
= P [LGD × p(Y ) < α0.999(L)]
= P [p(Y ) < α0.999(L)/LGD]
= N
(√
1− ρN−1(α0.999(L)/LGD)−N−1(PD)√
ρ
)
.
We have to modify this equation in order to get the VaR value:
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√
ρ×N−1(0.999) +N−1(0.999) =
√
1− ρN−1(α0.999(L)/LGD)
α0.999(L) = LGD ×N
(
N−1(PD) +
√
ρN−1(0.999)√
1− ρ
)
.
Substituting α0.999(L) in the formula for unexpected loss we get
UL = LGD ×N
(
N−1(PD) +
√
ρN−1(0.999)√
1− ρ
)
− LGD × PD. (5.1)
This last expression is the basis for the Basel II capital requirement
formula for a given loan. Let´s now introduce it and afterwards focus on
some details.
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5.2 Basel II Capital Requirement Formula
Capital requirement K for exposures not in default:
K = LGD
[
N
(N−1(PD) +√RN−1(0.999)√
1−R
)
− PD
]
1 + (M − 2.5)b(PD)
1− 1.5b(PD) 1.06,
where N(x) denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard
normal distribution, R is the correlation coefficient, M maturity and b(x) a
function of PDs given as
b(PD) = (0.08451− 0.05898× log(PD))2.
For defaulted assets, i.e. PD = 1, EL = LGD and consequently the
conditional PD (the N term) equals one. In this case capital requirement
is equal to zero. But we don´t yet know the realized recovery rate for this
loan and thus LGD. Therefore, BCBS has underlined the need of EL and
LGD being estimated separately. In particular, Basel II says: The capital
requirement K for a defaulted exposure is equal to the greater of zero and the
difference between its LGD and the bank’s best estimate of expected loss.
The risk-weighted asset amount RWA for a given exposure is then
the following product:
RWA = K × 12.5× EAD.
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5.2.1 Asset Correlation
In the Gordy´s ASRF model, ωi denotes the sensitivity of the i-th obligor
to the risk factor X that we would interprete as the state of global economy.
ωi is in other words the degree of the obligor’s exposure to the systematic
risk factor and may be expressed as the asset correlation. This variable,
in short, shows how the asset value of one borrower depends on the asset
value of another borrower. Likewise, correlation could be described as the
dependence of the asset value of a borrower on the general state of the
economy - all borrowers are linked to each other by this single risk factor. It
should be noted that asset correlation does not equal the default correlation.
Because different asset classes perform different dependence on the econ-
omy, correlations should be treated separately for each asset class. This can
be also motivated by example of two portfolios with identical expected loss
but different asset correlations in figure 5.1, source [3]. The solid curve per-
forms low variation and weak dependence on the systematic risk factor. This
character is usually retained by a retail portfolio. Defaults of retail customers
tend to be more idiosyncratic and less dependent on the economic cycle than
corporate defaults.
When calibrating the model, analysis of data provided by G10 supervi-
sors revealed two systematic dependencies described in [3]:
1. Asset correlations decrease with increasing PDs. (The higher the risk,
the higher the individual risk component.)
2. Asset correlations increase with firm size. (The larger the firm, the
higher its dependency on the business cycle.)
The asset correlation function exhibits both dependencies. It also in-
cludes two limits for correlations (results of the above mentioned analysis),
that differ according to asset classes. Correlations between these limits are
modelled by an exponential weighting function with coefficient k. This factor
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Figure 5.1: Two different loss experiences
influences the shape of our correlation function. The higher the k, the more
concave the curve. We will now focus on formulas for selected asset classes
separately.
For corporate exposures, the formula for R is the most complicated.
The coefficient k is set at 50, the lower bound at 12% for high PDs and
upper bound at 24% for low PDs (the first and second row of the formula,
respectively) and a size adjustment is applied (the third row; S denotes
the level of annual sales). The size adjustment affects only borrowers with
annual sales of 50 milion EUR or less. For borrowers with 5 milion EUR
or less annual sales, the size adjustment takes the value of 0.04 (maximum
adjustment).
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R = 0.12× 1− exp(−50× PD)
1− exp(−50)
+ 0.24×
[
1− 1− exp(−50× PD)
1− exp(−50)
]
− 0.04×
(
1− S − 5
45
)
.
The asset correlation function for bank and sovereign exposures
looks very similar (only the size adjustment is ommited):
R = 0.12× 1− exp(−50× PD)
1− exp(−50) + 0.24×
[
1− 1− exp(−50× PD)
1− exp(−50)
]
.
Correlation R for retail exposures differs quite a lot. Firstly, the coef-
ficient k is lower. It is set at 35. Secondly, limits for high and low PDs are
modified to 3% and 16%, respectively. Finally, no size adjustment is applied
for retail borrowers. Many analyses showed that there are also differences
within the class of retail exposures. The correlation coefficient for residen-
tial mortgages seems to be constant and quite high at the level of 15%1, the
correlation coefficient for revolving retail exposures (loan without a fixed
number of payments) was set at 4%. In other cases:
R = 0.03× 1− exp(−35× PD)
1− exp(−35) + 0.16×
[
1− 1− exp(−35× PD)
1− exp(−35)
]
.
The dependence of the correlation function on the k-factor and on limits
is shown in figures 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4.
1Explained in the next section.
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Figure 5.2: The asset correlation function for corporate exposures for all
possible PDs (without size adjustment)
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Figure 5.3: Detail of the asset correlation function for corporate exposures
for PDs up to 10% (without size adjustment)
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Figure 5.4: Detail of the asset correlation function for retail exposures for
PDs up to 10%
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5.2.2 Maturity Adjustment
We would now discuss the maturity adjustment (MA) part of the formula
for calculating capital requirement for credit risk (the last fraction in the
above mentioned formula):
MA =
1 + (M − 2.5)× b(PD)
1− 1.5× b(PD) .
Credit portfolio usually consists of loans with different maturities. The
long-term credits are naturally riskier than the short-term credits. Intu-
itively, our forecasts for next few months may be quite useful but not for the
horizon of ten years. Consequently, the capital requirement should increase
with maturity.
Moreover, maturity adjustment would also depend on the default prob-
ability as a consequence of mark-to-market valuation of loans. Potential
down-grades in future would affect high PDs borrower in stronger way than
borrowers with low PDs. A risk averse investor takes into account different
risk-adjusted discount factors. The actual form of the Basel II maturity ad-
justment has been derived by applying a specific mark-to-market credit risk
model. The output of this model is a matrix of VaR measures for a range of
rating grades and maturities as scheduled in table 5.1.
Maturity
PD grade 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years
1 VaR(1,1) VaR(1,2) VaR(1,3) VaR(1,4) VaR(1,5)
2 VaR(2,1) VaR(2,2) VaR(2,3) VaR(2,4) VaR(2,5)
3 VaR(3,1) VaR(3,2) VaR(3,3) VaR(3,4) VaR(3,5)
. . . VaR(. . .,1) VaR(. . .,2) VaR(. . . ,3) VaR(. . . ,4) VaR(. . . ,5)
Table 5.1: Matrix of VaR measures
Maturity adjustments are ratios of these VaR figures to the VaR of a
standard maturity, which was set to be 2.5 years. This standard maturity
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was chosen with regard to the fixed maturity assumption of the Basel II foun-
dation IRB approach. However, the Basel II maturity adjustment function
includes smoothed VaR figures. As described in [3], the regression function
was chosen in order to perform following properties.
1. The adjustments are linear and increasing in the maturity M.
∂MA
∂M
=
b(PD)
1− 1.5× b(PD) = const. > 0
This inequality holds for all PDs. For the characteristics of b(PD) and
∂MA
∂M
see figures 5.5 and 5.6.
2. The slope of the adjustment function with respect to M decreases as
the PD increases.
∂MA
∂M∂PD
= − 0.16434× b(PD)
3/2
x (1− 1.5× b(PD))2 −
0.10956× b(PD)1/2
x (1− 1.5× b(PD)) < 0
See figure 5.7.
3. For a maturity of one year the function yields the value of one and
hence the resulting capital requirements coincide with the ones derived
from Gordy´s ASRF model.
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Figure 5.5: The regression function b(PD)
42
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
Figure 5.6: The first derivate of the adjustment function with respect to M
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Figure 5.7: The second derivate of the adjustment function with respect to
M and PD
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It is important to mention that retail risk weight functions do not include
maturity adjustments. In the absence of sufficient data for retail borrowers,
maturity effects have been left as an implicit driver in the asset correlation
and no separate maturity adjustment is required. In this context, [3] gives
also explanation of the relatively high mortgage correlations: not only are
mortgage losses strongly linked to the mortgage collateral value and the ef-
fects of the overall economy on that collateral, but they have usually long
maturities that drive the asset correlation upwards as well.
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Chapter 6
Application of the Basel II
Capital Requirement Formula
Let´s now suppose we have a portfolio of 1000 identical loan instruments. All
of them have the same PD, the same LGD and also the same correlation to
the economy. Moreover, they have the same maturity and exposure (nominal
value). Let the maturity and the exposure be equal to one year and 1 EUR,
respectively. After one year, there are only two posibilities for the status of
a borrower. He either pays the whole amount back or he defaults, i.e. he is
not able to pay the whole debt. We may consider interest rate not to be an
important factor for our purposes.
Under these settings we would like to compare the Basel II capital re-
quirement for this portfolio with simulated unexpected loss. But what should
be the values of risk components in our example? We will use some basic
limits given in the New Basel Capital Accord, in particular in the foundation
IRB approach part.
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6.1 Input
• As stated in paragraph 285, under all circumstances, probability of
default should be greater than 0.03%, i.e. 0.0003. In our case when the
portfolio is not so large, it would be excessively small. The minimum
level of PD=0.001 should be sufficient in this case. And what about the
maximum level? In practice, PDs greater than 0.2 occur very seldomly.
This is caused by the fact that entities with very high probability of
default are rated as bad (and vice versa) and would not get any credit.
An example of probabilities of default for different rating categories
is given by figure 6.1. The whole transition matrix is used in more
advanced credit risk models that consider also the change in rating
and not only defaulted/not defaulted.
• Loss given default is recommended to equal 0.35 for secured se-
nior claims on corporates (simplified number), 0.45 for senior claims
on corporates not secured by recognised collateral, and 0.75 for all
subordinated exposures. We will therefore emphasize output for these
values.
• As already said, nominal value of each loan equals 1 EUR and interest
rate does not influence our numbers. Therefore exposure at default
equals 1 EUR.1
• The most complicated issue in our simulation assumptions is how to
deal with correlation. Since we don´t want to be influenced by the
Basel II ideas, we will not use the formula for R stated there. However,
we will follow upper and lower limits for correlations and also the
1This could be also treated as providing the credit on the discounted basis, i.e. the
borrower gets 1/(1 + r) EUR at the beginning of the year (r is the appropriate annual
interest rate) and should pay 1 EUR at the end of that year.
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shape2 of asset correlation function explained in section 5.2.1. As we
do not insist on class of corporate exposures or class of retail exposures,
we may fix only one lower limit and one upper limit. Let these limits
equal 0.03 and 0.24, respectively.
Figure 6.1: One-year transition matrix with default propabilities in the last
column.
6.2 Capital Requirement
As for computation of the capital requirement, we are allowed to simplify
the formula because of M=1. To get value for the whole portfolio we have
to multiply it by the number of instruments in the portfolio and also by the
exposure at default.
K = LGD
[
N
(N−1(PD) +√RN−1(0.999)√
1−R
)
−PD
]
×1000×1.06×1EUR.
2Correlation decreases with increasing PD.
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6.3 Simulation of the Unexpected Loss
As described earlier, unexpected loss is the difference between some quantile
and the expected loss, that are descriptive characteristics of some distribu-
tion. Since we are not able to get the real distribution function of credit
loss, we have to compute the empirical cumulative ditribution function as
its estimate.
Basic thoughts behind the single loss simulation procedure follow.
In order to get the default status and the number of defaults, we have to
generate a random variable representing the risk of each loan as described
in the section Vasicek´s Model.
εi =
√
R Y +
√
1−R Zi,
where Y, Zi, i = 1, 2, ..., 1000, are random drawings from the standard nor-
mal distribution. In this way we obtain pairwise correlated standard normal
variables εi.
Cumulative distribution function of this risk variables is then compared
to the given PD. We get the default status:
Di = 1, ifN(εi) < PD,
= 0, ifN(εi) ≥ PD,
and the number of defaults in this portfolio (denoted by NDef) as sum of
Di over all i.
NDef =
1000∑
i=1
Di
For each default we generate another random variable representing par-
ticular loss given default. LGD usually follows beta distribution that is a
continuous distribution defined on the interval [0,1] and parametrized by
two shape parametres, α and β. We compute these numbers from two equa-
tions that characterize the dependence of expected value and variance on α
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and β.
E(X) =
α
α + β
,
Var(X) =
αβ
(α + β)2(α + β + 1)
,
where X ∼ Beta(α, β) , i.e. random variable X follows beta ditribution with
parametres α and β.
Expected value is given by our inputed value of LGD, variance is fixed
to a small number (0.025) in order not to get a U-shaped beta distribution.3
Fixed variance could not be suitable for low or high values of LGD such
as 0.1 and 0.9. But as mentioned above, our inputed LGDs are bounded
by 0.35 and 0.75. We should better give an example. Let LGD (inputed)
equal 0.75 and the variance 0.025. Solving above mentioned equations, we
get α=4.875 and β=1.625. However, substituting e.g. 0.1 for the variance,
we get α = 0.65625, β = 0.21875. Both density functions are shown in figure
6.1.
At this point we know what the distribution of simulated losses (given
default) is, for further purposes denoted by lgdi for the i-th defaulted obligor.
But is it sufficient to generate iid random variables from this distribution? As
many studies have shown, losses given default are usually also correlated. But
we are not able to do that directly. Therefore we should generate correlated
random variable using following proposition.
Let F1 be the cumulative distribution function of X1. Then F1(X1) fol-
lows the uniform distribution over the interval [0,1] (F1(X1) ∼ U(0, 1)).
Moreover, let U ∼ U(0, 1). Then qF1(U) follows a ditribution with CDF F1.
qF1 is the quantile function corresponding to the CDF F1.
4
3We would like to built this model on a peak-shaped distribution of loss given default.
However, it is still the objective of many discussions among practitioners how does the
distribution of LGD in fact look like.
4F1 does not necessarily have to be continuous.
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Figure 6.2: Two density functions with expected value of 0.75, one of
Beta(4.875,1.625) - blue curve, and one of Beta(0.65625,0.21875) - purple
curve.
Let´s follow this proposition by parts. We set X1 equal to a standard
normally distributed variable, F1 from the first part is then the CDF of
standard normal distribution denoted by N. However, F1 from the second
part could be another CDF and for our objective the CDF of beta distri-
bution. So we generate new normal variables λi that are correlated by the
same factor as εi´s (as we suppose). Using this proposition, we get correlated
lgdi´s as:
lgdi = qB(N(λi)),
where qB is the quantile function of a given beta distribution and N is the
CDF of standard normal distribution.
In the final step we should obtain the total credit loss of our hypothetic
portfolio. This is done by multiplying all simulated losses from the last step
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by the exposure and adding them together5, i.e.
loss =
NDef∑
i=1
lgdi × 1EUR.
In order to get the empirical distribution function of credit loss, we have
to repeat this simulation many times. So we generate new εi´s and using this
variables we compute new NDef and new lgdi´s. How many times? Number
of simulations is influenced by the quantile. Our task is to provide a good
estimate of the 0.999-th quantile. So we should talk about the number of
simulations that is of the order of magnitude of 10,000. Let the start value
be 10,000. Then we will see.
Running a code with large number of simulations will probably be quite
time-consuming. The modification of computing single losses for more than
one combination of PD, R and LGD should save some time. Particularly:
• We compute εi´s for all given correlation factors in one step using the
same values of Y and Zi´s.
• We derive the numbers of defaults for all given Rs and PDs in one step
and the maximum of them MaxNDef.
• We generate new MaxNDef+1 drawings from standard normal distri-
bution in order to get lambdai´s for all Rs.
• For all possible combinations of PD, R and LGD given by (PDk,Rl,LGDm),
the single loss is computed as
loss =
NDefkl∑
i=1
lgdilm × 1EUR.
5This corresponds to the definition of annual credit loss of the portfolio on page 13.
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At this point, we are able to compute 10,000 simulations6 of single loss
for a given input and we would like to get estimate for quantile and expected
value. For simplicity, we sort the losses from smallest to biggest and take the
9,990-th value in sequence as theestimate for the 0.999-th quantile. Average
is obviously very good estimate for the expected value. Our estimate of the
unexpected value is therefore the difference between the 9,990-th biggest loss
and the average single loss.
6After a couple of simulations we found out that running the programm took quite a
lot of time and so we did not increase the number of simulations.
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6.4 Results
It is quite difficult to describe the dependence of some figure on a three-
dimensional input. However, these three determinants are somehow con-
nected. As already said, we will follow the Basel II idea of asset correlation
function. As shown in figures 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4, the lower the PD, the higher
the correlation. It is also good to see that asset correlation function is almost
constant for PDs higher than 0.1.
We should also note that the connection between PDs and LGDs exists
as well. A borrower with low probability of default would probably not be
asked to provide a good collateral and vice versa. On the other side, bad
creditors have to give some guarantee (and ensure lower LGD) in order to
get a credit. The lower loss given default is a compensation for the higher
default probability.
Let´s describe the difference between Basel II capital requirement and
estimated unexpected loss as a relative number, i.e. the ratio of these vari-
ables. Ratio would fit our needs at most, as both numbers may be of quite
varying size. In case, this ratio is greater one, capital requirement exceeds
the simulated loss and we may consider it as quiet conservative. But one
thing we cannot forget is the issue of reporting LGD. When computing the
estimate of unexpected loss, the average level of LGD is used. But for the
purpose of the Basel II formula downturn LGDs should be estimated. This
figure will be a bit higher than the average and the capital requirement as
well.
So what results do we expect? We suppose that the ratio is a bit bellow
one for usual combinations of PD, R and LGD and for values mentioned in
the foundation IRB approach (LGD=0.35, 0.45, 0.75).
Let´s now focus on the ratio for four categories of PDs and two categories
of LGDs.
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6.4.1 PDs lower than 0.01
The first category includes PDs smaller than 0.01 that are connected to
very high correlations. We have to consider highest values for corporate
exposures as well as for retail exposure that are in the level of 24% (20%
with the maximum size adjustment) and 16%, respectively. Loans assigned
by very low PDs should be considered as save and do not require a good
collateral.
We did computations for typical values of LGD at the level of 65%, 75%
and 85% and for one lower value only to see what the tendency is. Figure
6.4.1 shows the full range from zero to one as an example. All following
figures show details and values around one. Basel II capital requirement for
credit risk derived under these settings is quite sufficient. Especially when
we expect in to be even higher for downturn LGDs. A bit higher variance
for PD=0.001 is caused by the number of instruments in portfolio.
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Figure 6.3: LGD=0.75 & R=0.12, 0.14, 0.16, 0.18, 0.20, 0.22, 0.24
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Figure 6.4: LGD=0.25 & R=0.12, 0.14, 0.16, 0.18, 0.20, 0.22, 0.24.
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Figure 6.5: LGD=0.65 & R=0.12, 0.14, 0.16, 0.18, 0.20, 0.22, 0.24
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Figure 6.6: LGD=0.75 & R=0.12, 0.14, 0.16, 0.18, 0.20, 0.22, 0.24
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Figure 6.7: LGD=0.85 & R=0.12, 0.14, 0.16, 0.18, 0.20, 0.22, 0.24
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6.4.2 PDs between 0.01 and 0.09
The second group is characterized by not so high, but still varying correla-
tions. This corresponds to PDs from the interval <0.01,0.1>. Quite different
values of loss given default may be settled for these PDs but these values
are not likely to be high.
Following three figures show that the Basel II formula fits better for lower
LGD. The ratio of the requirement and the simulated unexpected loss is
below one (but very close to one) for LGD=20%. For the downturn LGD
would the requirement perfectly fit the estimate. For higher LGDs is the
bank forced to hold more money that it would probably need.
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Figure 6.8: LGD=0.2 & R=0.04, 0.08, 0.12, 0.16
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Figure 6.9: LGD=0.4 & R=0.04, 0.08, 0.12, 0.16
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Figure 6.10: LGD=0.6 & R=0.04, 0.08, 0.12, 0.16
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6.4.3 PDs between 0.09 and 0.20
Third group includes PDs between 0.1 and 0.2. This level of PD is still good
enough to get a credit and sets the level of correlation to equal 0.03 for retail
exposures, 0.08 for corporate exposures with maximum size adjustment and
0.12 for bank exposures or corporate exposures without any size adjustment.
Because of the higher default probability we did simulations for low LGDs,
but we wanted also to see the developement for a higher value.
Now we would try to explain results in figure 6.4.3. Why is the ratio so low?
This is caused by the average LGD intead of the downturn. The ratio for av-
erage LGD of 15% corresponds to 0.7, then the downturn LGD that provides
the ratio=1 should equal roughly 21%, ceteris paribus. This represents the
73% quantile of the beta distribution with expected value 0.15 and variance
0.025.
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Figure 6.11: LGD=0.15 & R=0.03, 0.08, 0.12
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Figure 6.12: LGD=0.25 & R=0.03, 0.08, 0.12
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Figure 6.13: LGD=0.35 & R=0.03, 0.08, 0.12
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Figure 6.14: LGD=0.45 & R=0.03, 0.08, 0.12
0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20
PD
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
ratio
Figure 6.15: LGD=0.75 & R=0.03, 0.08, 0.12
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6.4.4 PDs higher than 0.2
Finally, the last category of PDs (i.e. PDs higher than 0.2) should indicate
bad loans. We do not want to say that it is impossible for a portfolio to
include such a loan but it is less likely. Of course, it depends on the strategy
of each bank, whether it is desirable to have a number of risky loans in the
portfolio because of higher profit but this issue is not an objective of this
thesis.
The ratio is for high PDs very low. Let´s follow the idea mentioned in
the results for the last group of PDs. For example, given PD=0.9, R=0.03,
LGD=0.15 (the lower blue line) the ratio equals 0.2, i.e. estimated unex-
pected loss is five times higher than the requirement. What should be the
correct value of LGD in order to get the ratio=1? It should be 75%. This
loan is too risky (PD=0.9) that the very good collateral (averge LGD=0.15)
cannot be considered as very good for the purposes of the Basel II compu-
tations.
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Figure 6.16: R=0.03 & LGD=0.15, 0.25, 0.35, 0.45, 0.75
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6.4.5 Lower LGDs
We would like also to see, what is the dependency of the ratio on the loss
given default. Together with lower LGDs are very often higher PDs. Us-
ing results from following figures, we could say that because the ratios for
LGD=0.3, 0.4, 0.5 are very close to one, the capital requirement is sufficient
and the downturn LGD does not differ much. Whereas the right value of
LGD for the requirement should be higher in case the average LGD equals
0.1 or 0.2.
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Figure 6.17: R=0.03 (retail exposures) & PD=0.1, 0.15, 0.2.
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Figure 6.18: R=0.12 (corporate exposure) & PD=0.1, 0.15, 0.2.
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6.4.6 Higher LGDs
In these figures, whenever the ratio is close to one, the downturn LGD would
be certainly very close to the average value. For average LGD=0.4 should
we make the downturn value higher, on the other side it could be a bit less
for average LGD=0.9.
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Figure 6.19: R=0.14 & PD= 0.005, 0.01, 0.02, 0.05
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Figure 6.20: R=0.18 & PD=0.005, 0.01, 0.02, 0.05
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Figure 6.21: R=0.20 & PD=0.005, 0.01, 0.02, 0.05
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Chapter 7
Závěr / Conclusions
V této diplomové práci jsme popisovali postup při výpočtu kapitálového
požadavku ke kreditnímu riziku způsobem určeným předpisem Basel II.
Uvedli jsme důvody a způsob vzniku vzorečku, předpoklady, na kterých
Basel II staví a které často vychází z provedených studií, a zmínili jsme
rovněž, že se doposud diskutují některé části. V kapitole zabývající se srovnáním
výpočtů podle daného vzorce a odhadem jeho reálného ekvivalentu jsme
došli k výsledkům, že pro dané portfolio s posuzovanými vstupními vlast-
nostmi basilejský vzorec přibližně vyhovuje. Připomínáme ale, že výsledky se
musí interpretovat s ohledem na omezený počet jednotlivých simulací, počet
instrumentů v úvěrovém portfoliu a předpoklady pro vzorové portfolio.
This thesis included the Basel II procedure of assessing capital require-
ment for the credit risk, its developement, assumptions it is based on and
also a notice that still now exist discussions about the treatment of some
figures. The conclusion of the last chapter where the Basel II formula is com-
pared to estimates achieved by simulations should be following: Considering
the number of simulations, the number of instuments in the portfolio and
also the characteristics of the hypothetic portfolio, we may conclude that
the formula provides quite good figures.
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Appendix A
Mathematica notebook
ClearAll;
(* functions and procedures *)
betadist[lgd ]:=BetaDistribution[
α/.Solve [{α/(α + β) == lgd, αβ /((α + β)2(α + β + 1)) == 0.025} , {α, β}] [[1, 1]],
β/.Solve [{α/(α + β) == lgd, αβ /((α + β)2(α + β + 1)) == 0.025} , {α, β}] [[1, 2]]] ;
ndefaults[pd , risk ]:=Length[Select[Boole[Thread[CDF[ndist, risk] < pd]],#==1&]];
LgdriskForOne[risk , beta ]:=Quantile[beta,CDF[ndist, risk]];
Loss[lgdrisk , ndef ]:=Total[Take[lgdrisk, ndef]];
OneSimulation[pd , rho ,BetaDist ]:=
Module[{Idiosyncratic,Economy,Risk, Idiosyncratic2,Economy2,Risk2,
NumberOfDefaults, lgdrisk},
Idiosyncratic = RandomReal[ndist, nportfolio];
Economy = RandomReal[ndist];
Risk = Table[Sqrt[1−RHO]Idiosyncratic+Sqrt[RHO]Economy, {RHO, rho}];
NumberOfDefaults = Table[ndefaults[PD,RISK], {PD, pd}, {RISK,Risk}];
Idiosyncratic2 = RandomReal[ndist,Max[NumberOfDefaults]];
Economy2 = RandomReal[ndist];
Risk2 = Table[Sqrt[1−RHO]Idiosyncratic2+Sqrt[RHO]Economy2, {RHO, rho}];
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lgdrisk = Table[LgdriskForOne[risk, beta], {risk,Risk2}, {beta,BetaDist}];
Table[Table[Loss[LGDRISK,NDEF],
{LGDRISK, lgdrisk[[i,All]]}, {NDEF,NumberOfDefaults[[All, i]]}], {i, 1,Length[rho], 1}]
];
UL[pd , rho , lgd ]:=
Module[{lossdistrib, beta,ULoss},
beta = Map[betadist, lgd];
lossdistrib = Table[OneSimulation[pd, rho, beta], {nsimul}];
Table[Sort[lossdistrib[[All, i, j, k]]][[Ceiling[nsimulq]]]−Mean[lossdistrib[[All, i, j, k]]],
{i, 1,Length[rho], 1}, {j, 1,Length[lgd], 1}, {k, 1,Length[pd], 1}]
];
Requirement[pd , rho , lgd ]:=
nportfolio×1.06×Table[(LGDCDF[ndist,Quantile[ndist,PD]/Sqrt[1−RHO]
+ Sqrt[RHO/(1− RHO)]Quantile[ndist, 0.999]]− LGDPD),
{RHO, rho}, {LGD, lgd}, {PD, pd}];
(* input *)
ndist = NormalDistribution[];
nportfolio = 1000;
nsimul = 10000;
q = 0.999;
pd = Range[0.001, 0.01, 0.015];
rho = Range[0.12, 0.24, 0.02];
lgd = Range[0.15, 0.75, 0.2];
(* calculations itself *)
simul = UL[pd, rho, lgd];
basel = Requirement[pd, rho, lgd];
Export["simulation.xls", simul];
Export["requirement.xls", basel];
(* dimensions of the output :
Length[rho] (sheets)× Length[lgd] (rows)× Length[pd] (columns) *)
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